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Abstract
As autonomous agents become more ubiq-
uitous, they will eventually have to rea-
son about the mental state of other agents,
including those agents’ beliefs, desires and
goals – so-called theory of mind reasoning.
We introduce a collection of increasingly
complex theory of mind models of a “chaser”
pursuing a “runner”, known as the Chaser-
Runner model. We show that our imple-
mentation is a relatively straightforward the-
ory of mind model that can capture a vari-
ety of rich behaviors, which in turn, increase
runner detection rates relative to basic (non-
theory-of-mind) models. In addition, our pa-
per demonstrates that (1) using a planning-
as-inference formulation based on nested im-
portance sampling results in agents simulta-
neously reasoning about other agents’ plans
and crafting counter-plans, (2) probabilistic
programming is a natural way to describe
models in which each uses complex primitives
such as path planners to make decisions, and
(3) allocating additional computation to per-
form nested reasoning about agents result in
lower-variance estimates of expected utility.
1 Introduction
An autonomous agent that interacts with other agents
needs to do more than simply perceive and respond
to their environment. Eventually agents will need to
reason about all of the complexities inherent in the
real world, including the beliefs, intents and desires
of other intentional agents. This is known as theory
of mind, and is indispensable if we hope to one day
create agents capable of empathy, “reading between
the lines,” and interacting with humans as peers.
Preliminary work, under review.
In this paper, we explore how theory of mind can be
implemented using nested simulations in the form of
probabilistic programs. We develop a scenario involv-
ing two agents, a chaser and a runner. The chaser
seeks to intercept the runner and the runner seeks to
reach a goal location without detection. However, the
runner’s intended start location, goal location, and
likely path to the goal are initially unknown to the
chaser. We assume that the runner knows the current
location of the chaser, but not where the chaser will
move in the future. This results in a setting where
both agents must reason about each other, and about
how they reason about reasoning.
To simulate runner and chaser trajectories, we em-
ploy a variety of semi-realistic primitives, including
path planners and visibility graphs. We formulate the
model of the chaser and the runner as nested proba-
bilistic programs, which are conditioned according to
the desired behavior of the respective agents. The
model of the chaser is conditioned to maximize the
likelihood of detection, and the runner is conditioned
to minimize likelihood of detection. The result is a
probabilistic model over possible chaser trajectories.
At each point of time, the chaser imagines possible
future trajectories, along with possible runner trajec-
tories, and selects a move that has a high relative ex-
pected utility. This planning-as-inference formulation
[1] is a natural fit for probabilistic programming, which
makes it straightforward to incorporate complex de-
terministic primitives into both models, and perform
recursive Bayesian reasoning using the framework of
nested importance sampling [2].
We evaluate our models in a variety of scenarios and
demonstrate that nested Bayesian reasoning leads to
rational behaviors which maximize utility respectively
at each level. Our experiments show that our formula-
tion leads to improved runner detection rates relative
to basic models, and that allocating additional com-
putation to perform nested reasoning about agents re-
sults in lower-variance estimates of expected utility.
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Figure 1: (a) We generate a coarse polygonal city map from point cloud data of the city of Bremen, Germany.
(b) Visual distribution over paths a runner may take modeled with Random-Exploring Random Trees, RRTs,
from points A to B. (c) a 45◦ isovist, or range of sight, of the chaser. The isovist is properly blocked by buildings.
2 Background
2.1 Theory of Mind
Human children develop theory of mind during their
early years, generally between the ages of three and
six [3, 4]. Bello and Cassimatis [5] explore this phe-
nomenon with a computational model that suggests
that the underlying cognitive shifts required for the
development of theory of mind may be smaller than
previously supposed. Goodman et al. [6] present a
formal model that attempts to account for false belief
in children, and later take the innovative approach of
linking inference with causal reasoning [7]. Addition-
ally, the same group explores language as a type of
social cognition [8].
The development of theory of mind in machines leads
naturally to interaction with their human counter-
parts. Awais and Henrich [9], Fern et al. [10], and
Nguyen et al. [11] investigate collaboration between
humans and robots in which the robot must determine
the human’s (unobservable) goal. In a complementary
line of research, Sadigh et al. [12] explore the idea of
active information, in which the agent’s own behaviors
become a tool for identifying a human’s internal state.
Fully-developed theory of mind requires the possibility
of nested beliefs. Koller et al. [13] present an inference
algorithm for recursive stochastic programs. Frith and
Frith [14] argue that theory of mind can be modeled
using probabilistic programming, and demonstrate ex-
amples of nested conditioning with the probabilistic
programming language, Church. Zettlemoyer et al.
[15] address filtering in environments with many agents
and infinitely nested beliefs.
To our knowledge, our work is the first to model nested
reasoning about agents in a time-dependent manner.
Prior work by Baker et al. [16] develops a Bayesian
framework for reasoning about preferences of individ-
ual agents based on observed time-dependent trajec-
tories. Our work differs in that our environment is
not discretized into a grid world, and as such repre-
sents a continuous action space. Work by Stuhlmu¨ller
and Goodman [17] employed probabilistic programs to
model nested reasoning about other agents. Relative
to this work, our work differs in that agents update
and act upon their beliefs of other agents in a time-
dependent manner, whereas the work by Stuhlmu¨ller
and Goodman [17] considers problems in which there
is a single decision.
2.2 Probabilistic Program Inference
To represent our generative model cleanly and to per-
form inference in it, we employ the tools of proba-
bilistic programming [18]. This allows us to define
probabilistic models that incorporate control flow, li-
braries of deterministic primitives, and data struc-
tures. A probabilistic program is a procedural model
that, when run unconditionally, yields a sample from
a prior distribution. Running probabilistic programs
forward can be quite fast, and is limited only by the
native speed of the interpreter for the language.
Inference in probabilistic programming involves rea-
soning about a target distribution that is conditioned
by a likelihood, or more generally a notion of utility
[18]. Inference for probabilistic programs is difficult
because of the flexibility that probabilistic program-
ming languages provide: an inference algorithm must
behave reasonably for any program a user wishes to
write. Many probabilistic programming systems rely
on Monte Carlo methods due to their generality [19–
23]. Methods based on importance sampling and SMC
have become particularly popular [24–28], owing to
their simplicity and compositionality [2].
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For our purposes, the most important feature of prob-
abilistic programming languages is that they allow us
to freely mix deterministic and stochastic elements, re-
sulting in tremendous modeling flexibility. This makes
it relatively easy to (for example) describe distribu-
tions over Rapidly-Exploring Random Tree (RRTs),
isovists, or even distributions that involve optimiza-
tion problems as a subcomponent of the distribution.
3 Simulation Primitives
Although probabilistic programming has previously
been used to model theory of mind [17], past imple-
mentations have thus far considered relatively simplis-
tic problems involving a small number of decisions.
In this paper, we not only model a setting in which
agents must reason about future events, but also do so
in a manner that involves reasoning about properties
of the physical world around them. To enable this type
of reasoning, we will employ a number of semi-realistic
simulation primitives.
The environment. To search for and intercept the
runner, the chaser requires a representation of the
world that allows reasoning about starting locations,
goals, plans, movement and visibility. We use a polyg-
onal model designed around a known, fixed map of the
city of Bremen, Germany [29], shown in Fig. 1 (a).
Path planning and trajectory optimization. We
model paths using a RRT [30], a randomized path
planning algorithm designed to handle nonholonomic
constraints and high degrees of freedom. We leverage
the random nature of the RRT to describe an entire
distribution over possible paths: each generated RRT
path can be viewed as a sample from the distribution of
possible paths taken by a runner (see Fig. 1 (b)). RRTs
naturally consider short paths as well as long paths to
the goal location. To foreshadow a bit, note that be-
cause we will be performing inference over RRTs condi-
tioned on not being detected, the runner will naturally
tend to use paths that minimize the chance of detec-
tion, which are often, but not always, the shortest and
most direct. Our RRTs are refined using a trajectory
optimizer to eliminate bumps and wiggles.
Visibility and detection. Detection of the runner
by the chaser is modeled using an isovist, a polygon
representation of the chaser’s current range of sight
[31, 32]. Given a map, chaser location, and runner
location, the isovist determines the likelihood that the
runner was detected. Although an isovist usually uses
a 360 degree view to describe all possible points of
sight to the chaser, we limit the range of sight to 45
degrees, and add direction to the chaser’s sight as seen
in Fig. 1 (c). The direction of the chaser’s line of sight
is determined by the imagined location of the runner.
4 The Chaser-Runner Model
To model theory of mind, we will develop a nested
probabilistic program in which a Chaser plans a tra-
jectory by maximizing the probability of interception
relative to imagined runner trajectories. The model
for runner trajectories, in turn, assumes that the run-
ner imagines chaser trajectories and avoids paths with
a high probability of interception.
Our model has four levels: the episode model sam-
ples a sequence of moves by the chaser. Each move is
sampled from the outermost model, which describes
the beliefs of the chaser about the expected utility of
moves. This model compares future chaser trajectories
to possible runner trajectories and assigns higher prob-
ability to trajectories in which the runner is likely to
be detected. The runner trajectories are in turn sam-
pled from the middlemost model, which minimizes
detection probability based on imagined chaser trajec-
tories that are sampled from the innermost model.
These three models work in tandem to create nuanced
inferences about where the chaser believes the runner
might be, and how it ought to counter-plan to maxi-
mize probability of detection.
Algorithm 1 shows pseudo-code for the Chaser-Runner
model, formulated as nested probabilistic programs,
which we refer to as queries. Together, these pro-
grams define a planning-as-inference problem [1] in
which queries generate weighted samples, resulting in
a nested importance sampling [2] scheme that we de-
scribe in more detail below.
The episode model initializes the location of the
chaser to a specified start location xc1 = x
c
start. For
subsequent time points t = 2 . . . T , the model samples
a weighted partial trajectory (xc1:t, wt) from the out-
ermost chaser model. After the final iteration, the
model returns the completed trajectory xc1:T and the
product over incremental weights w1:T .
The outermost model describes the chaser’s plan
for trajectories, given the chaser’s belief about possible
runner trajectories. The chaser selects a goal location
xcgoal at random and uses the RRT planner to sam-
ple a possible future trajectory xct:T . Note that this
trajectory is random, owing to the stochastic nature
of the RRT algorithm. In order to evaluate the util-
ity of this trajectory, the chaser imagines a possible
runner trajectory by sampling from the middlemost
runner model. The chaser then evaluates the utility
of the trajectory by using an isovist representation to
determine the number of time points T cvisible during
which the runner is visible to the chaser. The chaser
then conditions the sampled trajectories by defining a
weight wc = exp(αT cvisible). As we will discuss below,
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Algorithm 1 Probabilistic program implementation
of the Chaser-Runner model. The episode model
samples moves from a nested chaser model, which
in turn simulates runner trajectories from a second
nested runner model. The chaser model is con-
ditioned to maximize the probability of future detec-
tions, whereas the runner model is conditioned min-
imize both past and future detections. At each time
step t, we propose K future trajectories for the chaser
and K×L trajectories for the runner. These trajecto-
ries are then resampled to K partial trajectories xc1:t,
resulting in a SMC sampler for the chaser model.
Qchaser←resample(importance(chaser,K),K)
Qrunner← importance(runner, L)
Qnaive-chaser← importance(naive-chaser, 1)
query episode(xcstart) . Episode model
xc1 ← xcstart
for t in 2 . . . T do
xc1:t, wt ;Q
chaser(xc1:t−1)
return xc1:T ,
∏
t wt
query chaser(xc1:t−1) . Outer Model
xcgoal ∼ Uniform({xa, . . . , xj})
xct:T ∼ rrt-plan(xct−1, xcgoal)
xrt:T , w
r ;Qrunner(xc1:t−1)
T cvisible ← time-visible(xrt:T , xct:T )
wc ← exp(α T cvisible)
return xc1:t, w
c · wr
query runner(xc1:t−1) . Middle Model
xrstart ∼ Uniform({xa, . . . , xj})
xrgoal ∼ Uniform({xa, . . . , xj})
xr1:T ∼ rrt-plan(xrstart, xrgoal)
x˜ct:T , w˜
c ;Qnaive-chaser(xct−1)
T rvisible ← time-visible(xr1:T , {xc1:t−1, x˜ct:T })
wr ← exp(−α T rvisible)
return xrt:T , w
r · w˜c
query naive-chaser(xct−1) . Inner Model
x˜cgoal ∼ Uniform({xa, . . . , xj})
x˜ct:T ∼ rrt-plan(xct−1, x˜cgoal)
return x˜ct:T , 1
this corresponds to assigning a utility proportional to
T cvisible in a planning-as-inference formulation. The
model discards most of the imagined future trajectory,
keeping only the next time point xct , and returns the
partial trajectory xc1:t, together with a weight w
c · wr
that reflects the utility of the chaser and the runner.
The middlemost model describes the chaser’s rea-
soning about possible runner trajectories. We assume
that the chaser models a worst-case scenario where
the runner is aware of the chaser’s location. This
could be, for example, because the runner uses a po-
lice scanner to listen in on the chaser’s reported lo-
cation. Moreover, we assume that at any point in
time, the episode only continues when the chaser has
not yet detected the runner. Finally, we assume that
the runner will seek to avoid detection by imagining a
chaser trajectory, and then selecting a trajectory that
will not intersect the that of the chaser. We imple-
ment these assumptions in the probabilistic program
as follows. The runner model first selects a start lo-
cation xrstart and goal location x
r
goal at random, and
then samples a random trajectory xr1:T using the RRT
planner. The runner then imagines a future chaser
trajectory by selecting a goal location x˜cgoal at ran-
dom and sampling x˜ct:T from the innermost model.
We then condition this sample by computing the to-
tal time of visibility T rvisible, based on both the known
past trajectory xc1:t−1 and the imagined future trajec-
tory x˜ct:T of the chaser. Finally, we assign a weight
wr = exp(−αT rvisible), which corresponds to a nega-
tive utility (i.e. a cost) proportional to T rvisible in the
planning-as-inference formulation.
The innermost model describes future chaser tra-
jectories imagined by the runner. This model is the
simplest of all the models in our nested formulation.
Given the previous location xct−1 of the chaser, the run-
ner imagines a goal location x˜cgoal at random and then
uses the RRT planner to a sample a random future tra-
jectory x˜ct:T . Since this model is not conditioned in any
way, it returns weight 1.
5 Planning as Inference Formulation
The Chaser-Runner model performs two levels of
nested inference. At the episode level, we infer the
next time point xct , conditioning on expected future
detections. In order to evaluate this likelihood, we
simulate runner trajectories that are conditioned to
avoid future detections. We will perform inference us-
ing a nested importance sampling scheme [2], which
is a generalization of importance sampling in which
weighted samples at one level in the model are used
as proposals at other levels in the model. Note that
nested importance samplign is not a form of nested
Monte Carlo estimation as discussed in Rainforth et
al. [33] and Rainforth [34]. We discuss the distinctions
between the two methods below.
We implement conditioning using a planning-as-
inference formulation [1, 35]. In planning-as-inference
problems, the target density pi(x) = γ(x)/Z is defined
in terms of an unnormalized density
γ(x) = exp(R(x))p(x), (1)
which in turn is defined in terms of prior p(x) and
a utility or reward R(x). The normalizing constant
Z = E[exp(R(x))] is sometimes referred to as the de-
sirability [36].
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The Chaser-Runner model in Algorithm 1 defines a
sequence of unnormalized densities
γt(x
c
t:T , x˜
c
t:T , x
r
1:T ) = exp[α(T
c
visible − T rvisible)]
p(xct:T |xct−1)p(x˜ct:T |xct−1)p(xr1:T ).
In this density, the reward α(T cvisible−T rvisible) depends
on the difference between the number of time points
during which the chaser expects that the runner will
be visible, and the number of time points during which
the runner expects to be visible based the imagined
chaser trajectory (which reflects a more naive model
of the chaser). In other words, the the chaser aims to
identify trajectories that will result in likely detections
of the runner, under the assumption that the runner
will avoid trajectories where detection is likely given a
naive chaser model.
6 Nested Importance Sampling
We can perform inference in the chaser-runner model
using Monte Carlo method for probabilistic programs.
Algorithm 1 defines an importance sampling scheme.
At each time t, we sample xct ∼ pit(xct ) from the
marginal of the target density above. To do so, we
sample K particles from the chaser model. For each
sample, we draw L samples from the runner model.
We then perform resampling to select K of the result-
ing K ·L particles with, which corresponds to perform-
ing SMC sampling within the episode model.
To denote this sampling scheme, we define query dis-
tributions in lines 1-3 of Algorithm 1. We assume an
operator importance that accepts a query and a num-
ber of samples L and returns a transformed query Q
that accepts K samples, and returns K × L weighted
samples. We additionally assume a resample opera-
tion that accepts a query and a sample count K and
returns a new query that resamples K samples from a
query, down-sampling or up-sampling if necessary.
When L = 1, this sampling scheme reduces to stan-
dard SMC inference for probabilistic programs [26].
When L > 1 it can be understood as a a form of nested
importance sampling [2]. Note that in this sampling
scheme, each of the L samples corresponds a different
runner trajectory xr,k,l1:T , but that the reward for this
trajectory is evaluated relative to the same past xc,k1:t−1
and imagined future xc,kt:T trajectory for the chaser.
As noted above, nested importance sampling is not
the same as nested Monte Carlo estimation. In nested
Monte Carlo problems, we compute an expectation of
the form E[f(y,E[g(y, z)])], which is to say that we
compute an expectation in which, for each sample y,
we need to compute an expected value by marginal-
izing over samples z. In the chaser-runner problem,
we would obtain a nested Monte Carlo probelm if we
defined the weight
wkt = exp
[
Rˆ
(
xc,k1:T
)]
,
by averaging the reward over chaser trajectories
Rˆ
(
xc,k1:T
)
=
1
L
L∑
l=1
R
(
xc,k1:T , x
r,k,l
1:T
)
.
In nested importance sampling, we select a particle
xc,k1:T according to the average weight
wkt =
1
L
L∑
l=1
exp
[
R
(
xc,k1:T , x
r,k,l
1:T
)]
.
This is sometimes referred to as nested conditioning, in
the context of probabilistic programming systems [34].
For any choice of L, this is a valid importance sampling
scheme in which the importance weight provides an
unbiased estimate of the normalizing constant.
7 Experiments
We carry out three categories of experiments: 1) tra-
jectory visualization experiments, in which we qualita-
tively evaluate what forms of rational behavior arise
in our model depending on conditioning, 2) detection
rate experiments, which test to what extent a more ac-
curate model of a runner enables the chaser to detect
the runner most often, and 3) sample budget experi-
ments, where we quantify the trade-offs in allocating
our sample budget at different levels of the model.
7.1 Visualization of Trajectories
Before carrying out a more quantitative evaluation of
the chaser-runner model, we visualize sampled trajec-
tories to show how nested inference converges empir-
ically to rational behavior at each level of the model.
We begin by considering a simplified scenario in which
we assume fixed start and goal locations. These lo-
cations are known to both the chaser and the runner,
which means that the chaser and runner do not have
to perform inference over possible goal locations. Fig-
ure 2 (a) shows a heat map of naive chaser paths in the
innermost model, which are conditioned on the start
and goal locations. In Figure 2 (b), we show a heat
map of runner paths, in which the runner travels in
the opposite direction along the same two locations.
We observe that the runner avoids direct routes so as
to minimize chance of detection. In Figure 2 (c) we
show a heat map of chaser trajectories in the outer-
most model, which shows that the chaser selects paths
that are likely to lead to interception of the runner. To-
gether, Figures 2 (a)-(c) demonstrate how our Chaser-
Runner model can perform planning conditioned on
start and end locations.
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Figure 2: Chaser and runner trajectories in the innermost, middlemost, and outermost models where
locations circled in red are the starting locations for each agent. We show posterior distributions of L runner and
naive chaser paths, when (K,L) = 128, 16 for a single resampled sample k. (a)-(c) show posterior distributions
over paths after running importance sampling where we condition the start and goal locations for each agent.
Figures (d)-(e) show posterior paths after we only condition the start locations for the agents .
Naive Runner Smarter Runner
C's Infer R's Infer C's Next
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art Chaser
Sm
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Figure 3: (a) Smart chaser playing against a naive run-
ner, where the chaser anticipates the the intersection
point and heads in the correct direction to detect the
runner. (b) Smart chaser playing against a smarter
runner. (c) Smartest chaser against the naive runner.
(d) Smartest Chaser infers the runner locations to be
more hidden, avoiding the center of the map. The
chaser successfully detects the smarter runner.
In Figure 2 (d)-(e), we visualize L naive chaser and
runner paths from a single k sample (sampled propor-
tionally to importance weights) at times step t ≥ 3.
The runner paths in Figure 2 (e) once again avoid de-
tection relative to the naive chaser paths in Figure 2
(d). Although the naive chaser travels directly toward
goal locations from the upper end of the map, in this
particular k sample, the naive chaser most often re-
mains on the left side of the map. This results in the
runner traveling through the center of city to minimize
probability of detection, but more often planning to-
ward location h. This is a case where the RRT planner
provides the runner with a shorter and direct plan to
minimize detection from the chaser.
7.2 Detection Experiments
To evaluate the influence of nested modeling on re-
sulting plans, we compare detection rates in the full
chaser-runner model to detection rates in three sim-
plified models. We run simulations using two types of
runners. We refer to the runner from the full model
as the smarter runner, and also consider a naive run-
ner which samples from the RRT planner in the same
manner as the naive chaser. We similarly consider two
chaser models. We refer to the chaser from the full
model as the smartest chaser. We additionally con-
sider a simplified model in which the chaser assumes a
naive runner, which we refer to as a smart chaser.
These two runner and chaser models together yield
4 modeling scenarios. Table 1 shows the average de-
tection rate over 50 restarts for each scenario. Fig-
ure 3 shows illustrative trajectories. In this figure, ‘C’
stands for Chaser; ‘R’ stands for runner. The blue
triangle represents the chaser’s true, current location.
Blue dashed lines represent the past chaser trajectory
whereas crosses mark future locations imagined by the
runner. Magenta diamonds represent samples of in-
ferred runner locations; magenta crosses represent in-
ferred future runner trajectories.
1. Naive Runner, Smart Chaser. A smart chaser
can reliably intercept a naive runner. Figure 3 (a) il-
lustrates a successful detection. We observe that the
chaser typically navigates to the center of the map.
Since the shortest path between most points crosses
the center of the map, this allows the chaser to inter-
cept the runner with high probability.
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Naive Runner Smarter Runner
Smart Chaser (49/50) = 0.98 (18/50) = 0.36
Smartest Chaser (49/50) = 0.98 (28/50) = 0.56
Table 1: Detection Rates for Agent Model Variants
2. Smarter Runner, Smart Chaser. When we
increase the model complexity of the runner, the de-
tection probability decreases. Figure 3 (b) illustrates
a prototypical result. The smarter runner expects the
chaser to remain in the center of the map, as it is try-
ing to head off a naive agent, and successfully avoids
the center of the map. In Figure 3 (b), the runner is
seen swerving sharply left taking a longer path around
the perimeter of the city to reach its goal. As a result,
the chaser is unable to find the runner for the rest
of the simulation. The average detection rate is 0.36,
which means that a smarter runner is able to avoid a
misinformed chaser in most episodes.
3. Naive Runner, Smartest Chaser. In this ex-
periment, the chaser assumes a smarter runner, even
though the runner’s behavior is in fact naive. Figure 3
(c) illustrates a prototypical result. Here, the mul-
timodality of the model’s inferences is apparent: the
chaser predicts two possible modes where the runner
could be (clusters of magenta triangles), but assigns
more probability mass to the upper (correct) cluster;
the result is that the chaser plans a path to that loca-
tion, which results in a detection. As it turns out, this
model variant results yields a detection rate of 0.98,
which is the same as that of in scenario 1, where the
chaser has an accurate model of the naive runner.
4. Smarter Runner, Smartest Chaser. Figure 3
(d) shows a prototypical result from the full chaser-
runner model, which results in a successful detec-
tion. The chaser anticipates that the runner will avoid
highly visible areas of the map and travel through alley
ways and around the city.
This experiment yielded a detection rate of 0.56, which
is significantly higher than the detection rate of 0.36
in experiment 2.
Discussion. These 4 scenarios illustrate that when
the runner reasons more deeply, he evades more ef-
fectively; Conversely when the chaser reasons more
deeply, he intercepts more effectively. Furthermore,
we show that a single, unified inference algorithm can
uncover a wide variety of intuitive, rational behaviors
for both the runner and the chaser.
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Figure 4: Log mean log weights, log Z¯, and Fractional
ESS (normalized by K) as a Function of Time for each
sample budget. Top Row: log Z¯R for the middlemost
model (left), and log Z¯C the outermost model, (right).
Bottom Row: The fractional ESS for each varying
K and L.
7.3 Sample Budget Experiments
To evaluate how the allocation of computational re-
sources to different levels of the model affects the vari-
ance of our importance sampling estimator, we carry
out experiments in which we set K and L to
(K,L) = (2048, 1), (512, 4), (128, 16), . . . (4, 512)
This fixes the total computation budget to KL = 2048
samples, which allows us to assess how many samples
from the runner are needed to effectively evaluate util-
ities in the chaser model.
In this experiment, we perform R = 10 independent
episode restarts for 7 combinations of (K,L) values.
For each episode we compute K chaser trajectories
and K · L runner trajectories for T = 28 time steps.
In other words, we compute 7 · R · T · K · L runner
trajectories wr, just over 4 million in total.
In Figure 4 (top row), we show the log mean log
weights for the chaser (left) and runner (right) at each
time point t. These are computed as follows
log Z¯ct =
1
R
R∑
r=1
log
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
wc,k,lt w
r,k,l
t
)
log Z¯rt =
1
R
R∑
r=1
log
(
1
KL
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
wr,k,lt
)
For each sample budget, Z¯ct decreases (left) as a func-
tion of time while Z¯rt remain relatively stable inde-
pendent of time (right). The decrease in Z¯ct is to
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Figure 5: Box plots showing quantiles of log weights
for the runner (left) and chaser (right) at each time
step in the simulation for varying K and L.
be expected, given that the probability of intercept-
ing the runner decreases as we approach the end of
the episode.
To get a evaluate the weight variance at each time step,
we compute the effective sample size (ESS), which for
a set of K · L weights {wk,l} is defined as
ESS =
(∑K
k=1
∑L
l=1 w
k,l
)2
/
(∑K
k=1
∑L
l=1(w
k,l)2
)
.
Figure 4 (bottom row), shows the fractional ESS (nor-
malized by K ·R) as a function of time for each sam-
ple budget. The effective sample size for the chaser
weights increases over the course of the episode, reflect-
ing that inference becomes easier owing to the previ-
ously mentioned conclusion of progressively decreasing
runner detection probabilities as we reach the end of
the episode.
Figure 5 shows quantiles with respect to restarts for
log mean weights, which further confirms the trend in
Figure 4. We show higher median log weights and
lower number of outliers as K decreases and L in-
creases, (K,L) = (16, 128) results show that computed
log weights are less robust when we draw a smaller
number of samples from the outermost model.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In the beginning of this paper, we considered the ques-
tion, “How do we give autonomous agents the ability to
infer the mental state of other agents?”, and more im-
portantly, “How do we reason about that mental state
for decision making and planning?” We have taken a
step towards this goal by contributing a model with
several novel elements, including complex path plan-
ning, visibility and nested planning-as-inference. We
have shown how relatively straightforward models of
theory of mind can capture a variety of rich behavior,
and that probabilistic programming is a natural way
to describe those models. We experimentally demon-
strated that runner detections increase as we increase
the complexity of the chaser model, therefore showing
that more complex models produce improved behav-
ior, and thus improved detection rates. Additionally
we show that nested reasoning results in lower-variance
estimates of expected utility.
One of the virtues of a Bayesian approach is com-
positionality. While we assumed access to a high-
level map, the same framework could be applied to
a joint model that blends high-level reasoning with
low-level perception. In such models, inferences driven
by theory of mind models could go beyond goals and
paths, and could additionally infer (for example) the
existence of objects or other agents seen by the run-
ner, but not by the chaser. Such integrated models
may require inference metaprogramming; but how best
to make such models computationally tractable is an
open question.
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